We use a new approach to study questions in political economy that relies on data on the subjective well-being of more than a quarter of a million people living in the OECD over the period 1975-92. Controlling for personal characteristics of the respondents, year and country fixed effects and country specific time trends, we find that the data describe social happiness functions for left-wing and right-wing individuals where inflation and unemployment enter negatively. We use these functions to test the root assumption of partisan business cycle models where leftwing individuals care more about unemployment relative to inflation than rightwingers. Bootstrap confidence intervals suggest that up to 90 per cent of the time the evidence is consistent with this assumption. Interestingly, we find that it is misleading to assume that the poor (rich) behave similarly to the left (right). For example, the poor are hurt more by inflation than the rich, while the left are hurt less than the right. Finally, we find that individuals declare themselves to be happier when the party they support is in power, even after controlling for economic variables. Our findings are hard to explain using median voter models but are to be expected in a partisan world.
I. Introduction

When the chips were down, the Democrats have taken their chances on inflation and the Republicans on unemployment and recession.
Arthur Okun 1 A number of economists and political scientists have studied how politics affects economic performance. Following the work of Downs (1957) , models have been built where policy makers try to please the electorate in opportune moments in order to remain in office (e.g. Nordhaus (1975) , Rogoff and Sibert (1988) ). An alternative approach assumes that policymakers have partisan motivations. These "partisan" models (e.g. Hibbs (1977) , Alesina (1987) ) predict that different political parties will favor different policies. The potential of these two approaches in explaining business cycles sparked an enormous amount of interest and numerous papers have tried to test their predictions.
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At least two conclusions seem to emerge from this work. The first is that formal tests are difficult to construct. Since policy makers' preferences are not observed, all the papers focus on the outcomes and choice of policies under different governments. But countries are subject to shocks. Thus, unless we really have other things equal, observing a different choice of policy, or a different experience in terms of, say, inflation is not enough to identify the competing theories. This is difficult with the data available.
Second, the evidence, although not conclusive, tends to favor partisan models over opportunistic models, particularly when the focus is on economic outcomes rather than policy instruments (see, for example, Frey and Schneider (1978a, b) , Golden and Poterba (1980) , Hibbs (1987) , Grier (1989) , Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1993) inter alia). It is worth stating the conclusions of what is one of the more comprehensive multicountry empirical papers in the area. Looking at the impact of elections on the behavior of economic outcomes, Alesina and Roubini (1992) find that a) the evidence is generally adverse to the basic Nordhaus (1975) model; b) the data show an electoral cycle on the inflation rate, consistent with the opportunistic model of Rogoff and Sibert (1988) ; c) the evidence is also consistent with the partisan model, particularly for a subset of countries with bi-partisan systems; and d) the partisan model with permanent effects on output and unemployment is rejected.
In this paper we adopt a different strategy to study the validity of these two approaches and, more generally, the relationship between politics and economics. We first separate individuals according to their political inclination and collect a measure of their declared happiness levels. With this information we construct measures of social happiness for each country and year in our sample, both for the left and for the right subsamples. We then study how these measures are affected by basic macroeconomic (like inflation and unemployment) and political variables (like the color of the party in government). Since partisan models assume that the happiness (or 'objective') functions of different political parties look different, a natural first step is to look if the happiness functions of their constituencies look different. It is worth emphasizing that our approach, although based on surveys, does not involve asking people directly questions about the costs of inflation, as in Shiller (1996) .
Our first task, then, is to test the extent to which these partisan social happiness functions support the root assumption in partisan models where left-wing parties represent constituencies who care more about unemployment relative to inflation compared to right-wing parties (Hibbs (1977) , Alesina (1987) ). We then check whether our results are being influenced by some time-varying omitted variable. Specifically we check how our results change when we control for aggregate economic activity and government consumption, two variables that could be correlated with inflation and unemployment and affect partisan happiness differentially. We also test if the weights with which macro variables enter partisan social happiness functions have changed over time. Lastly, we also include the political ideology of the party in government. This serves to control for other omitted variables, and also provides an independent test of partisan versus opportunistic models of the economy.
2 See Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) for a review. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) discuss the evidence that can be used to support the assumptions of the partisan model, assuming we can use the poor (rich) to proxy for the left (right) wing. In particular, they review the work of Hibbs (1987) who extends earlier work by Blinder and Esaki (1978) and others (e.g. Thurow (1970) ) that study the impact of macroeconomics on income distribution. They summarize these findings as follows: " Hibbs (1987) 
provides unambiguous evidence about unemployment's effect on income distribution in the United States: an increase in unemployment reduces the income shares of the population's two poorest quintiles and increases those of the two richest quintiles. (…) Inflation's distributional effects are
harder to pinpoint with precision." (pp. 47-8) . Interestingly, research on these important issues has diminished over the last couple of decades. This is quite a drawback since the most persuasive of these papers involve a time series study for the US over the period . Typically, these studies regress the share of income going to the country's i th quintile on inflation, unemployment and a time trend. But it is well known, for example, that income distribution in the US has continued to worsen even after unemployment and inflation were controlled in the mid-1980's, so there is a question mark on the explanatory power of those earlier models.
Our paper builds on the literature on well-being and economic performance. A small literature has studied the relationship between well-being and economic variables at the individual level. These can be thought of as microeconomic studies of happiness. For example, Easterlin (1974) , Inglehart (1990) and others find a strong correlation between individual income and happiness within countries. Inglehart (1990) , Clark and Oswald (1994) , and others study the impact of falling unemployed on well-being, while
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) study reported happiness amongst the self-employed in their study of entrepreneurship. A small number of papers have studied happiness from a macroeconomic perspective. The seminal paper here is Easterlin (1974) who studies the evolution of a society's aggregate level of well-being over time and relates it to rising income levels (see also Warr (1993) and Inglehart (1996) ). Morawetz et al (1977) examine the effect of a community's distribution of income and self-rated happiness, and Mayer and Jencks (1999) study the effects of income inequality on happiness at the state level in the U.S.. Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (1997) study the effect of higher inflation and unemployment rates on aggregate happiness, Granato, Inglehart and Leblang (1996) explore the relationship between life satisfaction and the stability of democracy, and Frey and Stutzer (1999) study the effect of institutions of direct democracy on happiness across the Swiss cantons.
Our paper, and we believe much of the happiness literature, can be understood as an application of experienced utility, a concept that emphasises the pleasures derived from consumption (discussed in Kahneman and Thaler (1991) Ng (1996) discusses the theoretical structure of subjective well-being responses while Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) propose a formal axiomatic defense of experienced utility (see also Tinbergen (1991) and van Praag (1991) ).
Section II describes the data. Section III outlines the empirical implementation while section IV estimates partisan social happiness functions. The appendix presents results using an alternative definition of partisanship. Section V concludes.
II. The Data
In order to construct our measures of partisan social happiness, we use the EuroBarometer Survey Series for 1975 (see Inglehart, Reich and Melich (1994 Respondents must also answer separate questions regarding their political affiliation. We use two of them. The first asks the respondent which political party they support. The exact question asks:
"If an election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?".
In each country, the political parties available to the respondent to choose from are later classified by political scientists into right and left. Of the full sample, 47 per cent declare that they would support a left-wing party, 12 per cent a center party and 41 per cent a right-wing party if an election were held tomorrow. In Table A we can see that right wingers seem to be a happier bunch, at least in the raw data. A second question is used to provide a robustness check (the results using this measure are reported in Table IA In order to generate our measure of partisan social welfare, we follow a two-stage procedure. First, for each country in our sample, we regress individual life satisfaction responses on personal characteristics of the respondent and an indicator of the year in which the survey was conducted. These can be thought of as micro-econometric happiness equations. We restrict attention to individuals who declare themselves to support right-wing (left-wing) parties and take the coefficients on the year dummies as our yearly indicator of unexplained "right-wing (left-wing) social happiness" in the country (see Table B for an example). Thus, our measure of "partisan social happiness"
for the left (right) is the average unexplained response to the happiness question given by individuals who support left-wing (right-wing) parties, after controlling for personal characteristics
Validation
In this sub-section we review some arguments that have been used in defence of using happiness data. The first is a market-based argument: psychologists, who study well-being for a living, use these data. Presumably, if markets work and there was a better way to study well-being, people who insist on using bad data would be driven out of the market. A second, and perhaps more persuasive, argument is that well-being data pass what psychologists sometimes call validation exercises. Pavot (1991) , for example, finds that respondents who report that they are very happy tend to smile more, an act that arguably is correlated with true internal happiness. A similar finding on the duration of so called "Duchenne smiles" is provided in Eckman, Davidson, and Friesen (1990) . Konow and Early (1999) cite a number of studies that are also helpful in assessing the validity of well-being data. These include Fordyce (1988) showing that different measures of wellbeing correlate well with one another, with subject recall of positive versus negative life events (Seidlitz, Wyer and Diener (1997) ); with reports of friends and family members (Diener (1984) , Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz (1993) ); and with physical measures like heart rate and blood pressure measures of responses to stress (Shedler, Mayman and Manis (1993) ) or electroencephalogram measures of prefrontal brain activity (Sutton and Davidson (1997) ).
An issue that has also been considered in the psychology literature is that, in formulating their responses, subjects are influenced by what they believe to be the socially desirable response. If the social norm is to be happy, subjects may bias their response upwards. Since the first studies in the area, psychologists have found evidence pointing out that this concern may be exaggerated (e.g. Rorer (1965) , Bradburn (1969) ).
Furthermore, Konow and Early (1999) present experimental evidence showing that the Marlowe-Crowne measure of social desirability is uncorrelated with happiness data.
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Lastly, at least part of the influence of social norms can be controlled for in the empirical specifications later on.
A further argument in defence of subjective well-being data, inspired by results presented in Inglehart (1990) , is that happiness data are correlated with suicide rates. 6 Di Tella et al (1997) test this idea by regressing aggregate suicide rates on country-by-year average reported life satisfaction, using a similar panel of countries used later in this paper (one year shorter). Controlling for country and year fixed effects, the relationship is negative and statistically significant at the 6 per cent level. country happiness is U-shaped in age and monotonically increasing in income). Thus, the data seem to behave in a less erratic manner than an economist used to working with hard data would expect. and right (77, 947) . A number of personal characteristics have a similar effect on the happiness responses of the two groups. As an illustration note that, in happiness terms, unemployment is 1.4 times worse than falling from the top to the bottom income quartile for a left-winger, whereas it is 1.2 times as bad for a right-winger. A divorce appears to be more costly for individuals who declare they support right-wing parties. The effect of divorce on a right-winger in terms of happiness is almost the same size (94%) as the effect of being unemployed. On the other hand, the effect of divorce on a left-winger in terms of happiness is 76% of the effect of unemployment.
III. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy has three stages. In the first stage we obtain estimates of the average happiness level of the left and right in each of the country/years of our sample, after controlling for personal characteristics. In the second we estimate the impact of macroeconomic and political variables on the happiness of both groups, while in the third stage we test if the impact of these variables is different across the two groups in a statistically significant fashion.
In the first stage we estimate two ordered logit regressions, one for left-wing individuals and one for right-wing individuals, for each country (n=1 to 10) of the following form:
where HAPPY tj g is the answer to the well-being question "Are you Satisfied with the life you lead?" given by individual j in year t, who belongs to political group g (g=left or right)
. Ω tj g is the vector of personal characteristics for individual j in political group g, and the vector δ g contains the coefficients of the personal characteristics. The coefficients on the set of time dummies for political group g are denoted φ t g , while µ tj g are independently,
identically distributed random errors. Table B shows two such regressions for the whole of Europe. Our main interest is a measure of average happiness for each group (left and separately for the right), after controlling for personal characteristics, for each year in the sample given by the coefficients on the year dummies, φ t g . This is done for each country in the sample. In the second stage we run an Ordinary Least Squares regression of the form:
where YEAR n g denotes a country specific time trend, λ n g is a country fixed effect, η t g is a year fixed effect and ε nt g is an error term (i.i.d.). The two-stage procedure ensures that we have the same (correct) level of aggregation between left and right-hand variables, so it avoids the bias specified in Moulton (1983) . The same can be achieved by estimation in one stage but correcting the standard errors.
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In the last stage of our empirical strategy we test whether the ratio of the coefficients α g / β g is greater for left-wing voters than for the right-wing voters. In other words, we test:
Since the ratio of the two coefficients on unemployment and inflation (α g / β g ) does not have a standard distribution, bootstrapping techniques were used to compute the character of the sampling distribution of our test statistic (e.g. Efron and Tibshirani (1993) ). The results were also checked against Monte-Carlo simulations, which imposed the assumption of normality of the regression error terms.
7 In Di Tella et al (1997) we compare a strategy similar to the one followed here with one based on using residuals from Ordinary Least Squares regressions for the first microeconometric stage (instead of logit). Similar second stage results were found, regardless of the method used. 8 One-step estimates yield similar results and are available upon request. We prefer the two-stage procedure, as it is focused on aggregate magnitudes and our paper deals with macroeconomic questions. It is also transparent in that the number of observations is directly related to the degrees of freedom that we actually have.
As inflation and, in particular, unemployment may be expected to be correlated with other variables, we also run regressions, controlling for aggregate economic activity, TOTAL GDP (an index of the country's total GDP), and government consumption,
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION (final consumption expenditure by the government divided by GDP). We also test if left and right political groups have changed their weights over inflation/unemployment over time by including a dummy (DUMYPOST83) equal to 1 in every year after 1983, the mid point of our sample, and zero otherwise.
Finally, we attempt to capture the impact of politics on partisan well-being. We construct a variable called RIGHT WING to measure the extent to which political preferences in the country lean towards the right. It is similar to those employed by political scientists to indicate the left/right position of a government, and is constructed in two steps (e.g. Hicks and Swank (1992) ). First, we collect the number of votes received by each party participating in cabinet and express them as a percentage of the total votes received by all parties with cabinet representation. In the second step, this percentage of support is multiplied by a left/right political scale (from Castles and Mair (1984)) and summed across all the cabinet parties to give a continuous variable. 9 The coefficient on RIGHT WING captures the overall residual effect of government on partisan well-beingafter controlling for economic outcomes. Summary statistics appear in Table C , while a full description of the variables used and their sources is given in Appendix III.
IV. Results
Our primary regression specifications in Table I estimate the effect of inflation and unemployment on the social well-being of the whole sample (HAPPINESS-ALL), and both the left and the right separately (HAPPINESS-LEFT and HAPPINESS-RIGHT). In regression (1), both higher unemployment and inflation rates decrease well-being in the full sample. The effects are well defined, with t-statistics of 4.5 and 5.3 respectively, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on UNEMPLOYMENT and INFLATION are equal. Since the left-hand variable comes from a logit equation, we can interpret the estimated effects as probabilities. For example, regression (1) tells us that if the unemployment rate increases 10 percentage points, the probability that the average person (in terms of happiness) declares him/herself to be happy (either very satisfied or fairly satisfied) falls by 12 percentage points (from 85% to 73%). If the inflation rate were to increase by 10 percentage points, this probability would drop by 9 percentage points.
Regressions (2) and (3) percentage points, the probability that the average left-winger declares him/herself very satisfied or fairly satisfied with life falls 13 percentage points (from 83% to 70%), whereas it would drop 10 percentage points if there was a 10 percentage point increase in inflation. If unemployment were to increase 10 percentage points, the probability that the average right-winger reports him/herself to be in the top two happiness categories falls 8 percentage points (from 90% to 82%) whereas if the increase was of 10 percentage points in inflation the drop would be of 9 percentage points. Using the alternative definition of partisanship yields results that appear to favor the assumptions of the partisan models more strongly (see regressions (33) and (34) in Table IA in Appendix II). These results suggest that if the unemployment rate increases 10 percentage points, the probability that the average left-winger reports him/herself very satisfied or fairly satisfied drops 15
percentage points (from 78% to 63%) whereas if inflation were to increase 10 percentage points that probability would fall 8 percentage points. On the other hand, if the unemployment rate rose 10 percentage points, the probability that the average rightwinger says he/she is happy drops 10 percentage points (from 89% to 79%) whereas if inflation were to increase 10 percentage points that probability would fall by 12 percentage points.
An important question in political business cycle theory asks whether the trade-off between UNEMPLOYMENT and INFLATION is different across the two sub-samples (i.e. concerning the ratio α g / β g ). Partisan social happiness functions, such as regressions (2) It could be argued that making these comparisons underestimates the differential social cost of unemployment across the two groups if the left had a higher rate of unemployment than the right. That is, we should also include the direct effect on the happiness of an individual due to falling unemployed (from the micro-econometric first stage regressions) which might afflict a greater proportion of left-wing individuals than right-wing ones. Remember that we have already controlled for the personal cost of being unemployed in the first stage regressions. Thus, as long as left-wingers have higher unemployment rates than right-wingers, including the personal cost of unemployment is likely to show that the left cares more about unemployment than the right. In other words, excluding the direct costs biases our results against finding evidence consistent with the assumptions of partisan business cycles. We choose, however, not to include this direct cost. A first reason concerns the fact that the difference is small. 12 Second, and more importantly, the unemployed are a minority within each party. If parties decide by majority voting, the relevant effect is that on the average member of the party.
A source of potential concern with the above results is that the coefficient on INFLATION or UNEMPLOYMENT may be capturing the effects of another variable that could be correlated with them and that the group cares about. The first candidate is the level of economic activity, a variable that conceivably could have a differential impact on the left and the right. Regression (4) in Table I shows a similar regression to (1) that controls for TOTAL GDP, an index of economic activity that equals 100 in 1985 in each country. One cannot again reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on UNEMPLOYMENT and INFLATION are equal for the full sample. The effect of income is positive, as expected, though it is only significant at the 10 per cent level. Regressions (5) and (6) show that the coefficient on TOTAL GDP in the happiness regression for the right is larger than the corresponding coefficient in the regression for the left by a factor of three, although it is only significant at the 6 per cent level.
Interestingly, the coefficients on INFLATION in both regressions stay almost unchanged, while the coefficient on UNEMPLOYMENT shows a large drop only in the 12 The unemployment rate in the full sample of 10 countries amongst individuals who said they supported a left-wing party was 5.8 per cent, compared with 4.0 per cent for individuals who said they supported right-wing parties. Di Tella et al (1997) discuss how to incorporate these effects. In order to throw some light on these issues we construct a dummy variable,
DUMYPOST83
, that equals one in every year after 1983 and zero otherwise. Regressions (7), (8) and (9) in Table II use it to test these ideas. Regression (9) shows larger effects of UNEMPLOYMENT and INFLATION on happiness post-1983 for the right sub-sample.
The coefficient on UNEMPLOYMENT is significantly different from zero at the 11 per cent level while that on INFLATION is significant at the 2 per cent level. Interestingly, there do not seem to be well-defined changes post-1983 in the happiness regression for the left. Thus, based on the evidence presented, a move by a left-wing party towards more anti-inflation policies (such as those in Blair's New Labour) should be explained in terms of median-voter ideas, rather than partisan motives.
The last three regressions in Table II control for government consumption divided by GDP, GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION. The idea, again, is to try to control for a variable that could be correlated with inflation and unemployment and that also affects partisan happiness. It can certainly be argued that left-wingers care about the amount of government spending and that some of it could be used to reduce the social cost of unemployment, like spending on programs to help train the unemployed. Regression (10) reveals a positive and significant effect of government consumption in the happiness of the full sample. Regressions (11) and (12) show that the fact that we control for government consumption and aggregate economic activity in the country does not change the result that the right seem to care more about inflation than unemployment relative to the left. Again we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on UNEMPLOYMENT is zero in the right sub-sample. The level of significance on the UNEMPLOYMENT coefficient in the left sub-sample is only 6 per cent however. Using bootstrap techniques to compute the character of the sampling distribution of the ratio of the coefficients showed that in 81.2 per cent of 1,000 bootstrap repetitions, the unemployment/inflation trade-off was consistent with the assumptions in partisan business cycle models.
Interestingly, the coefficient on GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION in the regression for the left sub-sample is more than twice as large as in the right sub-sample, where it is insignificant.
Table III studies the influence of political color of the government in power on partisan well-being. This is a further attempt at controlling for the effect of other omitted variables correlated with partisan happiness. The results from regressions (13), (14) and (15) suggest that the effect of unemployment is no longer significantly associated with happiness at conventional levels (the significance of the coefficient on UNEMPLOYMENT in the left sub-sample, where it is larger, is 19 per cent). Bootstrap simulations showed that in 85.8 per cent of 1,000 repetitions, the evidence indicated that the left cared more about unemployment relative to inflation than the right.
The coefficient on RIGHT WING is insignificant for the overall sample, but is precisely estimated and with opposite signs in the left and right sub-samples. It seems that respondents declare themselves to be happier when the party in power has a similar ideological position to themselves, even after we control for key performance indicators such as unemployment, inflation and income. This result is hard to explain using a purely opportunistic approach to modeling the activities of political parties as developed, for example, in Rogoff and Sibert (1988) . If the government tailored its policies to the median voter in order to stay in power, it would be difficult to explain why people care so much about the identity of the party forming government. Moreover, if a left wing government, for example, leaned towards the center then its supporters would tend to be particularly unhappy while right wingers would tend to be happier. Instead the opposite occurs. It is easier to explain this result by imagining that different parties care differently about the set of policies and outcomes that can be affected by the government and that parties are loyal to the wishes of their constituents.
One explanation is that RIGHT WING may be capturing the effect on partisan well-being of variables that have been omitted from our regressions. One candidate is inequality, for which comparable panel data are unavailable. Another candidate is government consumption. Interestingly, including GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION in regressions (13) (14) and (15) abortions or on the ability of homosexual individuals to serve in the military forces.
Alternatively, voters may simply care about some non-policy characteristic of the government, experiencing happiness when the party they support is in power, regardless of its policies. Such characteristics could be personal charisma (attractive only to the party's constituency) or some degree of broader ideological congruence. Lastly, it is possible that there is a pure "victory effect", where individuals care that the party they support is in power, regardless of the characteristics of the policymaker or the policies he/she applies. 15 In other words, that politics enters directly into the utility function.
Lastly, regressions (16), (17) and (18) Part of the change in the size of the coefficients of interest when RIGHT WING is included is due to the fact that the number of observations drops to 125, and partly due to the fact that this variable is highly correlated with INFLATION, and UNEMPLOYMENT. This is shown in Table IV . The coefficients on these variables are also useful in calculating the total effect of a change in the political color of the party in power on partisan happiness. There seem to be two effects. There is the direct effect of RIGHT WING on partisan happiness calculated in regressions (14) and (15) The results using this second definition of political affiliation showed in every regression at least as strong support for the root assumption in partisan models. In regression equations (33) and (34) specification, the unemployment/inflation trade-off was consistent with the partisan business cycle assumptions in 90.1 per cent of 1,000 bootstrap repetitions.
In Table IIA there is no evidence of a differential effect of government consumption on the well-being of the right and the left using our second definition of political affiliation (regressions (39) and (40)). There is, again, a strong effect of the political color of the government in power (regressions (41)- (44)). Respondents declare themselves to be happier when the party in power has a similar ideological position to themselves. These pure partisan effects on well-being do not seem to have become weaker over time (regressions (43) and (44)). The unemployment/inflation trade-off was consistent with the partisan assumptions in 89.0 per cent of 1,000 bootstrap repetitions in regressions (41) and (42), and in 83.3 per cent of cases in regressions (43) and (44).
Happiness Equations for the Rich and Poor
Tables V and VI explore the hypothesis that partisan differences are driven by income differences. This is sometimes called the Marxist hypothesis as it implies that voters have some sort of class loyalty, and has been one of the main themes of the political business cycle literature. Hibbs (1987) The first thing to note is that, in contrast to previous research, we find strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the poor are hurt more by inflation than the rich.
From regressions (23) and (24), for example, we know that if inflation were to increase 10 percentage points, the probability that the average poor person declares him/herself to be in the top two happiness categories falls 14 percentage points (from 78% to 64%), while the probability that a rich person declares him/herself to be in the top two happiness categories drops 4 percentage points (from 91% to 87%).
The evidence however suggests that there are other differences with the partisan happiness equations studied above. A first difference appears comparing regressions (9) and (26), where it can be seen that the rich have not become more concerned with inflation over time to the same extent as the right have. In none of the regression equations in Table V can one reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on unemployment and inflation are equal, both in the equations for the poor ( (21), (23) and (25)) and for the rich ( (22), (24) and (26)). Importantly, we cannot find evidence that the unemployment/inflation trade-off for the rich and poor favors the partisan assumptions.
Furthermore, there is no evidence of a differential effect of government consumption on the well-being of the rich and the poor (regressions (27) and (28) in Table VI ). If anything, the evidence suggests that the effect of government consumption on happiness is more positive for the rich sub-sample. Perhaps the most significant difference between partisan happiness and the happiness of the rich and poor concerns the impact of the color of the government. In contrast to the earlier results for the right and left, the happiness levels of the rich and poor do not depend on the ideological position of the government in power (regressions (29)-(32)).
V. Conclusions
This paper proposes a new approach to study questions in the literature on politics and macroeconomics that uses data commonly used in the psychology literature. The approach can be thought of as an application of the concept of experienced utility discussed in Khaneman and Thaler (1991) . It starts by constructing a measure of partisan social happiness using individual responses to a life satisfaction question from over a quarter of a million individuals living in 10 European countries over the period 1975-92.
By conditioning on the party that the respondents have voted for (or on the ideology they declare to have), we are able to obtain a measure of average partisan social happiness for each country-year combination. With this information, we form a panel to study the way macroeconomics and politics affect the well being of the main political constituencies.
We present partisan social happiness regressions that control for the personal characteristics of the respondents, country fixed effects, year fixed effects and country specific time trends. By and large, the evidence tends to favor the partisan approach to modeling business cycles: social happiness functions estimated on the right-wing portion of the population look different from those obtained for the left sub-sample. Using bootstrap simulations, we find some evidence that the unemployment/inflation trade-off was different for the two sub-samples. Up to 90 percent of the time this trade-off was consistent with the assumptions in partisan business cycle theory (i.e. Hibbs (1977) , Alesina (1987) ).
A surprising finding of the paper concerns the relative importance of politics. We include in our partisan happiness equations a variable that measures the ideological position of the government in power. The size of the coefficient is large and highly significant. It indicates that when the government leans more to the right ideologically, right-wing individuals tick up their happiness scores. In the same periods, left-wing individuals declare themselves to be more dissatisfied with their lives. One possible explanation for this result is that politics enters directly into the utility function.
Furthermore, the variable capturing the ideological position of the government (RIGHT WING) is strongly correlated with inflation (negatively) and unemployment (positively).
Thus, there seem to be two channels through which governments affect the well-being of their constituencies: a direct channel and an indirect effect through unemployment and inflation. This result indicates that the color of the government matters for a large part of the population.
We also explore the Marxist hypothesis that ideological differences can be traced back to differences in income. Thus, the rich are often assumed to be "equivalent" to the political right, and the poor to the left. We find a number of differences. First, and in contrast to previous research summarized in Alesina et al (1997) , we find that inflation hurts the poor more than the rich. Furthermore, we find that the happiness levels of the rich and poor are not affected at all by the ideological position of the government that happens to be in power. Importantly we cannot find evidence that the unemployment/inflation trade-off for the rich and poor favors the partisan assumptions.
The general results of the paper are in line with the assumptions made in partisan models of the business cycle, but are more difficult to reconcile with opportunistic models, such as Nordhaus (1975) or Rogoff and Sibert (1988) . In particular, if we assume that the unique objective of political parties is to win elections, it is hard to see why the correlation between partisan happiness and the political color of the party in government is so strong. One explanation would involve a model where parties partly cater for partisan support and partly behave opportunistically (as in Frey and Schneider (1978a, b) ). At a minimum, our findings reject the notion of purely opportunistic political parties which adopt identical policies to keep the median voter as happy as possible. 
Appendix I
Data Definition
HAPPINESS-ALL:
The coefficients on the year dummies in an ordered logit Life Satisfaction regression that controls for personal characteristics, for each country across all individuals.
HAPPINESS-LEFT:
Two definitions were used. For Tables I-III it is the coefficients on the year dummies in an ordered logit Life Satisfaction regression that controls for personal characteristics, for each country conditioning on the individuals who say they support left-wing parties. The exact Euro-Barometer question asks: "If an election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?". Political scientists have subsequently classified these parties into left and right. For Tables IA and IIA the definition is the coefficients on the year dummies in an ordered logit Life Satisfaction regression that controls for personal characteristics, for each country conditioning on the individuals who say they place their political views as being to the left. The exact Euro-Barometer question asks: "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your own views on this scale?" (from 1 to 10). Respondents were classified as being left for the purposes of the present paper, if their response was in categories 1, 2 or 3.
HAPPINESS-RIGHT:
Two definitions were used. For Tables I-III it is the coefficients on the year dummies in an ordered logit Life Satisfaction regression that controls for personal characteristics, for each country, conditioning on the individuals who say they support right-wing parties. The exact Euro-Barometer question asks: "If an election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?". Political scientists have subsequently classified these parties into left and right.
For Tables IA and IIA the definition is the coefficients on the year dummies in an ordered logit Life Satisfaction regression that controls for personal characteristics, for each country conditioning on the individuals who say they place their political views as being to the right. The exact Euro-Barometer question asks: "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your own views on this scale?" (from 1 to 10). Respondents were classified as being right for the purposes of the present paper, if their response was in categories 8, 9 or 10.
HAPPINESS-POOR:
The coefficients on the year dummies in an ordered logit Life Satisfaction regression that controls for personal characteristics, for each country, conditioning on individuals who are in the bottom income quartile.
HAPPINESS-RICH:
The coefficients on the year dummies in an ordered logit Life Satisfaction regression that controls for personal characteristics, for each country, conditioning on individuals who are in the top income quartile.
UNEMPLOYMENT:
The unemployment rate, from the CEP-OECD data set .
INFLATION:
The inflation rate, as measured by the rate of change in consumer prices, from the CEP-OECD data set .
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION: Government final consumption expenditure divided by Gross Domestic Product, from the CEP-OECD data set .
TOTAL GDP: An index of Real GDP per Capita at the price levels and exchange rates of 1985, standardised to equal 100 in 1985 for each country, from the CEP-OECD data set .
RIGHT WING: Index of left/right political party strength, defined as the sum of the number of votes received by each party participating in cabinet expressed as a percentage of total votes received by all parties with cabinet representation, multiplied by a left/right political scale constructed by political scientists. Votes are from Mackie and Rose's (1982) , The International Almanac of Electoral History, cabinet composition is from The Europa Yearbook (1969-1989 editions) , and the left/right scale is from Castles and Mair (1984) .
DUMYPOST83:
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 in every year after 1983, the midpoint of our sample, and zero otherwise.
